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ARGUMENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The statement of the case is fully set forth in Appellants' opening brief, page 3. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The statement of the issue is fully set forth in Appellants' opening brief, page 4-7. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts are set forth in appellant's opening brief. Additional facts 
will be stated as appropriate in the argument. 
The Appellants shall be referred as "Satsudas", the Appellees as "Ohs" and Third 
Party Defendants as "Urns". 
ARGUMENT 
The appellants, Satsudas, responds to appellees, Ohs, brief in the same order as 
raised in the appellees brief. 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARD TO APPELLEES' 
The Ohs state that there is a sufficient bases in contract to support the Trial Court's 
award of attorney's fees. At the outset, it should be emphasized that the only subject matter 
contract was the Earnest Money Agreement between Satsudas and Ohs. The other 
contracts were incidental and submitted only to illustrate the interconnecting relationship of 
the properties. 
The Ohs methodically refer to each document executed between the Satsudas and 
Ohs, and the Ohs and Urns to convince this Court that a contractual bases exists as a matter 
of law. 
Whether there exists a contractual basis for an award of attorney's fees is a legal 
question and the standard for review is one of correctness and no particular difference 
given to the Trial Court in ruling on questions of law. Provo River Water Users vs. 
Morgan, 857 P2d 927 (Utah 1993). 
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On this issue, the difficulty arises because the Trial Court failed to articulate the 
contractual basis for the award of attorney's fees. The Trial Court states "that an adequate 
basis in contract exists for such an award". First Amended Order of Dismissal of 
Complaint and Third Party Complaint and judgment in favor of defendants Ohs against 
plaintiffs Satsudas for attorney's fees. Addendum 12 and 13 of Appellants' Opening Brief. 
Without a specific finding as to events which would trigger the entitlement of 
attorney's fees under any of the contracts existing between the parties, this Court is unable 
to determine what contract the Trial Court used. 
For that reason alone, the matter should be remanded to the Trial Court for entry of 
finding. 
Saunders v. Sharp, 818 P2d 574 (UT. App. 1991), cited in appellants opening 
brief at page 29, mandates the Trial Court to announce the basis of the evidence and 
articulate the Findings of Facts and reversal of an award of attorney's fees is appropriate 
when the Trial Court failed to make appropriate findings and conclusion of law. Cabrerra 
vs. Cabrerra, 694 P2d 622 (UT 1985), cited on page 29 of appellants' opening brief. 
DEED OF TRUST 
The Deed of Trust, June 5, 1990, does not support the Trial Court's decision as a 
"contractual basis" as the appellees contend. 
The precise language of the Deed of Trust, paragraphs 4 and 7 does not serve as a 
legal basis for the award of attorney's fees. 
Paragraph 4 deals specifically with the defense of "any action or proceeding 
purporting to affect the security thereof, the title to said property, or rights and powers of 
trustee (Ohs).." 
Whereas, the appellees assert that the main action by the Satsudas somehow relates 
to the security of the subject party, the assertion is without substance and rings hollow. 
The subject property was sold by Satsudas for $860,000, a sum $240,000 greater than the 
price Satsudas paid. Appellees' Brief, page 12, paragraph 44. 
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Reliance upon paragraph 7 of the Deed of Trust is similarly over stated. The 
triggering event invoking paragraph 7 requires that the Satsudas "fail to. . .do any act as 
herein provided..." Emphasis mine. 
There was no allegation or fact produced at trial to establish that Satsudas failed to 
perform what was required to be done, i.e., make the monthly payments on a timely basis. 
Equally important is the fact that the Trial Court did not enter any finding regarding the 
Deef of Trust and default thereof. 
The thrust of Satsudas' case is simple. 
Satsudas did not receive what they bargained for. They expended to restore subject 
property to conform with what they purchased. They sought reimbursement for their out-
of-pocket expense. 
There was no abandonment of the contractual terms or challenge to the security 
interest held by the Ohs as claimed by the appellees. 
ASSIGNMENT OF CONTRACT 
The second line of defense used by the appellees is the Assignment of Contract, 
June 5, 1990, between Satsudas and Ohs. 
Paragraph 3(b) of the Assignment of Interest does not support the Trial Court's 
award of attorney's fees. 
The Assignment of Contract itself does not contain any languages regarding 
attorney's fees, thus, the assignment does not give the Ohs any independent contractual 
claim for attorney's fees. 
Paragraph 3 (b) read with the entire assignment means: 
1. That Satsudas will keep, observe, and perform all the terms, 
conditions and provisions of said agreement (Real Estate Contract) that are to be kept, 
observed and performed by the Ohs. 
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2. If Satsudas failed to so perform, Satsudas will hold harmless the 
Ohs from any actions, costs, damages, claims, and demands. . . arising out of an act or 
omission by Satsudas. 
Contrary to the Appellees claim that the above language should be expanded to any 
"acts" by Satsudas, the clear reading and plain unequivocal language mandates that the "act 
or omission" relates directly to what duties and obligations are required to be performed 
under the real estate contract 
Satsudas did not fail to perform on a timely basis any of the term and condition of 
the real estate contract; nor was any "act or omissions" proven at trial. 
Clearly, the Trial Court made no such finding and to make such finding would not 
have been supported by the evidence. 
REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
Initially, it should be noted Ohs were never in default on the terms of the real estate 
contract between the Ohs and Ums, dated May, 1987. 
The real estate contract required that Ohs pay Ums $4,728.65 per month, principal 
and interest on or before June 1, 1987 and a like sum on the first date of each month 
thereafter until the principal balance, together with accrued interest, has been paid in full. 
Stipulated Trial Exhibits #1; Addendum #2 of appellees' brief. 
Additionally a balloon payment was to be paid on or before May 1,1991, Id. 
Other affirmative acts were imposed on Ohs, such as payment of taxes for 1987 and 
thereafter (paragraph 9), covenants against liens (paragraph 10) and insurance (paragraph 
11) no waste, (paragraph 14). 
These affirmative acts by Ohs were the affirmative acts assigned to Satsudas under 
the Assignment of Contract dated January 5, 1990. 
No default had occurred or alleged to have occurred by the Ums against Ohs. All 
of the terms and conditions were performed by Ohs under the real estate contract up to the 
sale of the motel to Satsudas on January 5,1990. 
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After January 5,1990 the Satsudas fully performed the terms and conditions of the 
real estate contract, i.e.; payments of $4,728.65 per month to Ums on or before the first 
day of the month; balloon payment of $50,000.00 on May 1, 1991; payment of general 
property taxes, insurance, covenants against liens and no waste. 
No evidence was submitted nor was it intended by any of the parties that the Ohs 
were in default or that Satsudas were in default. 
Neither did any party submit any evidence or even suggest that the instant complaint 
by Satsudas and the third party complaint was an enforcement, termination or obtaining 
possession of the subject property. 
Ohs entitlement to attorney's fees against the Satsudas is no greater than that of 
Ums entitlement to attorney's fees against the Ohs. 
In either case, attorney fees entidement cannot be bottomed in paragraph 15 of the 
real estate contract. 
Certainly, the Trial Court failed to enter findings that the real estate contract was a 
legal basis for the award of attorney's fees for the Ohs against the Satsudas. 
The amended Findings of Fact were prepared by the Ohs. They failed to be explicit 
as to which contracts upon which they relied at the trial level. They choose to leave the 
award of attorney's fees ambiguously based "upon contract", presumably so as to forego a 
submission of evidence which would trigger the entidement and upon which contract or 
contracts and presumably to permit the scatter gun approach on appeal. 
This approach is evident when the appellees urge this Court to sustain the attorney's 
fees award on any basis even if the Trial Court did not consider them. Appellees' brief, 
page 14. 
Ohs did not attempt to convince this Court that their attorney's fees award is based 
upon the real estate contract, but only claim that the real estate contract is a sufficient basis 
for Ums attorney's fees against the Satsudas. 
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By osmosis, Urn's attorney's fees filters to Satsudas, by passing Ohs, by virtue of 
the Assignment of Contract. 
This approach is incredulous. It was not Satsudas act or conduct that brought the 
Ums into the lawsuit. It was Ohs act or conduct that brought upon themselves Ums 
participation as a third party defendant. 
Whereas, it may be speculated that Satsudas may be liable if they had joined Ums 
as party defendants because then their conduct caused the wrath of Ums' attorney's fees 
upon them, it is too far reaching to hold that Ohs conduct in commencing the third party 
complaint against Ums is direcdy or directly attributable to Satsudas' conduct. It was Ohs 
choice to either use Ums as witnesses or parties, just as it was Satsudas" choice. 
Satsudas, having talked to Ums before commencement of the action, knew that the 
Ums would be witnesses presumably favorable to Satsudas' position, Stipulated Facts 
Page 14, Appellants' Brief, Addendum #3. 
The Trial Court, early in the case, ruled that Ums were not indispensable parties. 
UMS* ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARDED DIRECTLY AGAINST SATSUDAS 
The appellees rely upon the "pass through theory" in an attempt to justify Ums' 
attorney's fees to be assessed direcdy to the Satsudas. 
The "pass through theory" was not mentioned in the Supplemental Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law. Appellants Brief, Addendum #19; rather the finding was that 
Ums' attorney's fees were necessarily and reasonably incurred to defend defendants third 
party action as "costs, claims and demands" under paragraph 3(b) of the Assignment of 
Contract. Id, paragraph 4-5. 
This issue was addressed in the prior argument. 
Nevertheless, the appellants will address the "forseeability" concept claim by the 
Ohs, i.e.; because of Satsudas litigation it was a foreseeable consequence that Ums would 
be made a party. 
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This foreseeable argument is without substance and is certainly negated by the 
Satsudas making inquiry with the Urns before the lawsuit was commenced. 
Ums reported that they had advised Ohs that the rooms were constructed without 
proper building permits. Stipulated Facts #14. Appellants Brief, Addendum #3. 
Moreover, the South Sanpitch vs. Pack case and Collier vs. Heinz cited in Appellees 
Brief, page 23, must be restricted in their facts. 
South Sanpitch case was a negligence case. 
Collier vs. Heinz dealt with a breach of contract, i.e., breach of a settlement 
agreement 
REASONABLENESS OF OHS' ATTORNEY'S FEES 
The reasonableness of Ohs' attorney's fees and the failure to allocate attorney's fees 
incurred from defending Satsudas and prosecuting the Third Party complaint is addressed 
in Appellants' Brief, page 17-22. 
SATSUDAS CLAIM OF FRAUD 
This issue is fully addressed in Appellants' Brief page 36-42. 
A correction must be made. 
Appellants stated that the Earnest Money Agreement contained no "as is" clause. 
Appellants' Brief, page 39. This statement is incorrect Paragraph B of the Earnest Money 
Agreement does contain an "as is" clause. 
However, the Appellants contend that the "as is" clause does not abrogate the 
express warranties in paragraph C of the same document. 
BREACH OF EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT 
The only subject matter document brought into the instant case was the Earnest 
Money Agreement, dated November 16,1989 between Satsudas and Ohs. 
The principle defense to Satsudas claim for breach of the express warranties 
contained in paragraph C of the Earnest Money Agreement lies upon the doctrine of 
merger. Appellees' Brief, page 35-39. 
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Thus, it would appear that if the merger doctrine does not or should not apply, the 
breach of the Earnest Money Agreement is established. 
The Appellants agree that the Schafer vs. Harrigan case and Secor vs. Knight case 
cited in Appellee's Brief on page 30 applied merger doctrine to eliminating the buyer's 
claim for breach of warranty. 
In the Schafer case and Secor vs. Knight cited in pages 34 and 35 of Appellees' 
Brief, the Appellate Court relied upon express language of the abrogation clause in each 
case. 
The abrogation clause in the instant case differs. There is an express reservation to 
eliminating the abrogation clause from express warranties: 
"Paragraph O, Abrogation: Except for express warranties under this 
agreement, the execution and delivery of the final closing documents shall abrogate 
this agreement." 
Thus, as stated in Appellants' Opening Brief, page 30, and for emphasis now, the 
merger doctrine does not apply and the Trial Court erred in its application. 
In effect, the Trial Court reformed the Earnest Money Agreement beyond the 
written terms and the intent of the parties, i.e., the sale and purchase of a 40-unit motel 
with all units in operable condition. 
Paragraph C(c) is worthy of recalling: 
4The plumbing, heating, air conditioning and ventilation systems, electrical 
systems and appliances shall be in sound and satisfactory working order." 
Appellants' Opening Brief, page 30-33, addresses the deficiency noted and need 
not be repeated. 
Should this Court sustain the Trial Court on the application of the merger doctrine 
and that none of the exceptions to merger doctrine apply, i.e., existence of collateral rights 
or fraud, the Earnest Money Agreement would fall and with it, any claims by Satsudas, 
Ohs and Ums would also fall. 
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Should the Court reverse the Trial Court in the application of the merger doctrine, it 
would follow that, at the very least, the Satsudas would be entitled to cost of restoring the 
defective rooms, $37,381.00 loss of profits, and attorney's fees. 
SALE OF MOTEL AT PROFIT 
The sale of motel at profit does not preclude Satsudas' claim for special damages. 
The Appellees claim that Satsudas lost their claim for special damages when the 
Trial Court entered a suumary judgment against the Satsudas on the "Benefit of the 
Bargain" damages. 
Appellees further claim that the issue was not preserved for appeal. 
The Appellees position is incorrect for the following reasons: 
1. The Plaintiffs complaint alleges damages in form of the Benefit of the 
Bargain, paragraph 22 of Plaintiffs complaint, Appellants Opening Brief, Addendum 1, 
and special damages, paragraph 23 Id. 
2. The Appellants, during oral argument, stressed to the Court that 
elimination of the Benefit of Bargain claim does not rule out special damages and Satsudas 
objection to order granting Ohs motion for summary judgment. ROA, 
The issue of special damages surviving elimination of the "Benefit of Bargain" 
claim is briefed in Appellants' Brief, page 34-35. 
CONCLUSION 
Satsudas purchased a 40-unit motel. It was to be a turn key operation. Ohs sold a 
40-unit motel representing that it was a turn key operation. It was not. Satsudas suffered 
out-of-pocket expenses to bring the motel up to code. 
Appellants specifically request: 
1. That the award of attorney's fees for Ohs and Urns be reversed as not 
based upon subject matter contracts, as opposed to exhibits submitted merely to show the 
relationship between the parties. 
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2. In the alternative that the issue of attorney's fees for Ohs and Ums be 
remanded to the Trial Court for adequate findings and conclusions, as to the contractual 
basis for the award of attorney's fees. 
3. Reverse the Trial Court's decision in the application of the merger 
doctrine and enter a judgment in favor of the Satsudas against Ohs for out-of-pocket 
expenses or remand the issue of special damages to the Trial Court for entry of judgment in 
special damages, including attorney's fees at trial. 
4. Reverse the Trial Court's order for summary judgment on the "Benefit 
of Bargain" claim for damages and enter a judgment for Satsudas' special damages or 
remand the case for entry of judgment on special damages. 
5. Award the Plaintiffs attorney's fee for the appeal and remand the case 
for ruling on reasonable attorney's fees. 
DATED this 3rd day of July, 1996. ^ ^ ^ 
^ B t f l W T S t J N A G A 1 
~~ Attorney for the Appellants 
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